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4ABSTRACT
The liberalised economic policies have exposed Indian industry
to several challenges. In response to this, the Indian economy has
witnessed a sharp increase in mergers and acquisitions. An attempt has
been made in this paper to analyse the significance of such mergers and
its characteristics. The study suggests that acceleration of the merger
movement in the early 1990s is accompanied by the dominance of
mergers between firms belonging to  same business group or house with
similar product lines. So it is  argued that though the merger movement
in the early 1990s might have contributed to an increase in product or
asset concentration measured on a firm-wise basis, it could not have
contributed to an increase in concentration as measured by  relative shares
of business groups. But, there are signs that mergers between unrelated
firms, though numerically less significant, have been gaining ground.
This is especially true of mergers involving foreign-owned firms. The
participation of foreign-controlled firms in the merger process has
increased significantly since 1992-93. However it is evident that mergers
contributed significantly to asset-growth in only one fifth of the sample
firms studied. Most of these  firms mobilised a large share of resources
through capital markets,  to finance their expansion during 1989-90 to
1994-95. Therefore the study argues that the merger wave in the early
1990s was more a means of internal restructuring rather than an
instrument to further product market or asset share.
JEL Classification : D43, G34, L41
Key Words: mergers and acquisitions; horizontal merger, vertical
merger, conglomeration, private corporate sector, India
5Introduction
The structural adjustment programme and the new industrial policy
adopted by the Government of India would allow business houses to
undertake without restriction any programme of expansion either by
entering into a new market or through expansion in an existing market.
In that context, it also appears that Indian business houses are increasingly
resorting to mergers and acquisitions as a means to growth. The present
paper seeks to analyse the role of such mergers in the private corporate
manufacturing sector during the early 1990s. This paper consists of five
sections. The first section discusses the concepts and definitions and
some theoretical issues related to mergers. The second section explains
the different type of "merger wave" occurred in  developed countries
and the Indian experience. The third section analyses the significance of
merger process in the 1990s. This section also explains the data source
and the method used for selecting the samples. An in-depth analysis of
the characteristics of these mergers in terms of management and of their
economic rationale is carried out in the fourth section. The role of
acquisitions in the growth of assets of  acquiring firms and  sources of
financing their growth are analysed in the last section.
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Concepts and Definition
Mergers or amalgamation, result in the combination of two or more
companies into one, wherein the merging entities lose their identities.
No fresh investment is made through this process. However, an exchange
of shares takes place between the entities involved in such a process.
Generally, the company that survives  is the buyer which retains its
identity and the seller company is extinguished (Ramaiya, 1977).
A merger can also be defined as an amalgamation if all assets and
liabilities  of one company are transferred to the transferee company in
consideration of payment in the form of equity shares of the transferee
company or debentures or cash or a mix of the above modes of payment.
An acquisition, on the other hand, is aimed at gaining a controlling
interest in the share capital of  acquired company. It can be enforced
through an agreement with the persons holding a majority interest in the
company's management or through purchasing shares in the open market
or purchasing new shares by private treaty or by making a take-over
offer to the general body of shareholders.
A takeover, which is essentially an acquisition, differs from a
merger in its approach to business combinations. In the process of
takeover, the acquiring company decides the maximum price that is to
be offered to the acquired firm and hence takes lesser time in completing
a transaction than in mergers, provided the top management of the
acquired company is co-operative. In merger transactions, the
consideration is paid for in shares whereas in a takeover, the consideration
is in the form of cash. However, mergers and takeovers can be treated as
similar processes, since in both cases at least one set of shareholders
looses executive control over a corporation which they otherwise held.
7Based on the objective profile of an offer, business combinations
such as mergers, acquisitions or takeovers could be categorised as vertical,
horizontal, circular or conglomerate mergers (Peter, 1975).
Vertical Combination
A vertical combination is one in which a company takes over or
seeks a merger with another company in order to ensure backward
integration or assimilation of the sources of supply or forward integration
towards market outlets. The acquirer company gains a strong position
due to the imperfect market of its intermediary products and also through
control over product specifications. However, these gains must be
weighed against the adverse effects of the merger. For instance, firms
which have monopoly power in one stage may increase barriers to entry
through vertical integration and this would help to discriminate between
different purchasers by monopolisation of raw material supplies or
distributive outlets (Comanor, 1967).
Horizontal Combination
A horizontal combination is a merger of two competing firms
belonging to the same industry which are at the same stage of the
industrial process. These mergers are carried out to obtain economies of
scale in production by eliminating duplication of facilities and operations
and broadening the product line, reducing investment in working capital,
eliminating competition through product concentration, reducing
advertising costs, increasing market segments and exercising better
control over the market. It is also an indirect route to achieving technical
economies of large scale.
Circular Combination
In a circular combination, companies producing distinct products
in the same industry, seek amalgamation to share common distribution
8and research facilities in order to obtain economies by eliminating costs
of duplication and promoting market enlargement. The acquiring
company obtains benefits in the form of economies of resource sharing
and diversification (Ansoff and Weston, 1962).
Conglomerate Combination
A conglomerate combination is the amalgamation of two
companies engaged in unrelated industries. It enhances the overall
stability of the acquirer company and improves the balance in the
company's total portfolio of diverse products and production processes.
Through this process, the acquired firm gets access to the existing
productive resources of the conglomerate which result in technical
efficiency and furthermore it can have access to the greater financial
strength of the present acquirer which provides a financial basis for further
expansion by acquiring potential competitors. These processes also lead
to changes in the structure and behaviour of acquired industries since it
opens up new possibilities (Mueller, 1969).
Mergers, Growth and Diversification
Mergers, we have mentioned, are an important means to corporate
growth. A firm or a group can be expanded in several  ways. One way of
growth, is through the extension of existing activities by upscaling
capacities or establishing a new firm with fresh investment in existing
product markets. However, a firm normally faces two major constraints
when it seeks to grow within a single market. When the size of the market
is small and the rate of expansion is too low, the growth of a set of firms
in the same market might affect adversely the growth of other firms.
Thus, it could lead to price wars or takeover bids. This, and other
constraints such as control by the government over the expansion of
9firms in particular lines, encourage firms to grow by diversifying into
other markets.
Through diversification, firms can increase their sales by either
creating new markets for the same product or entering new markets by
diversifying into new product lines. When the present market does not
provide much additional opportunity for growth, diversification as a
strategy is vital for a firm if it wants to augment its demand base. In
practice, diversification is an important way in which firms grow. A firm
is said to diversify if it produces new products including intermediate
products that are sufficiently different from the existing product lines
(Penrose, 1959). Besides, it also diversifies to take account of the
changing opportunity costs of its own resources, which might occur when
existing markets become relatively less profitable than opportunities for
new investments elsewhere. With a growing and reasonably stable
industry, a shift can take place in the manufacturing processes, the product
profiles and the demand patterns arising out of technological innovations.
To reduce this vulnerability, a firm with excellent apparent growth and
stability prospects which becomes vulnerable to sudden changes because
its product line has a narrow technological and market base, may need
to increase its flexibility by broadening this base to new markets and
particularly to new areas of technology. For these reasons, during the
1970s, for example, large firms in India and elsewhere had  diversified
into new fields, related or unrelated to the existing business (Kumar,
1985,p.105).
Growth and diversification can be achieved both internally and
externally. Mergers, tender offers and joint ventures are all strategies
through which a firm can grow externally.  A firm would grow by external
expansion when it becomes difficult for a firm to use its resources
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efficiently for further growth. Mergers do not require any cash outlay
and therefore can be considered as the only way of diversifying activities
for a firm whose financial position is not strong and whose managerial
and technical services are highly specific to existing products (Penrose,
1959).
Section II
Merger Waves in the Developed Countries
A series of merger waves has been witnessed in many of the market-
oriented economies. There have been three major merger waves in the
United States during the periods 1887-1905, 1916-1929, and post-world
war II. In the US economy, the first merger wave during 1895 to 1904
was characterised by horizontal mergers, which increased concentration
in a number of industries. The second wave, 1922-29, appeared to have
been characterised by a higher incidence of vertical integration and
diversified mergers. However, the immediate post-war merger boom was
relatively smaller. The difference between these two periods can be
described as "mergers for monopoly" and "mergers for oligopoly". Anti-
trust policies appear to have influenced the third wave significantly, which
commenced after World War II. (Scherer, 1979). The diversification and
conglomerate types dominated the merger movement during the sixties.
During the eighties, the nature of mergers has been characterised by a
return to specialisation and an enormous increase in real sizes. The merger
waves in the US, in the eighties and beyond are characterised by the
strong relatedness between the businesses of the merging firms unlike
the conglomerate mergers in the sixties and seventies. In constant dollar
terms, the mergers during 1988 increased almost four to six times more
than the value of mergers in the early seventies. The value of mergers
11
which represented 10 to 15 percent of the investments made in plant and
machinery in the seventies, increased to 40-45 percent levels in the later
half of the eighties (Weston, et.al, 1996).
The other developed countries such as the UK, Canada, France,
Germany and Japan have also witnessed periods of a sharp rise in merger
activity, although the US has been the most active mergers market. In
the United Kingdom, horizontal mergers were the dominant form between
1954 and 1965 and since then there has been a trend towards diversified
merger. The value of assets acquired through diversified merger rose to
33 percent in 1972 from 5 percent in 1966. The merger wave since 1980s
witnessed divestments on a large scale. In 1992 it was accounted for 31
percent of all acquisitions and mergers. A continuously rising trend in
mergers has been noticed in Germany since 1958, with exceptionally
high growth rates in the number of mergers during 1969 and 1970.
Indian Experience
Though mergers between large business firms have been negotiated
and concluded right through the post-Independence period in India, a
full list of mergers and amalgamations settled during each year has been
published only since 1972-73. For this reason the discussion in this paper
of the overall trends in mergers and acquisitions in the private corporate
sector in India is restricted to the period 1972-73 to 1994-95. However,
the constrained choice of the year 1972-73 as the cut off period, is not
wholly inappropriate because a number of significant changes in
government policies became operative immediately before or in that year.
These changes were heralded, inter alia, through the abolition of the
managing agency system, the passage of the MRTP Act 1969, the
nationalisation of the banking system in 1969 and the announcement of
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new provisions granting tax relief in the Finance Bill for 19671 . All
these initiatives were aimed at curtailing the power of the big business
houses and dealing with the adverse consequences of the absence of
price competition among the established business groups. They therefore
affected the process of growth through mergers as well.
The trends in amalgamations and take-overs during the period
1972-73 to 1994-95 are given in the Table 1. The annual number of
amalgamations involving non-MRTP companies for the sub-period 1972-
73 to 1991-92 was calculated from the lists provided in the annual issues
of the publication "Registration and Liquidation of Joint Stock
Companies" prepared by the R&D division of the Department of
Company Affairs (DCA). Similarly, the annual number of amalgamations
and take-overs involving MRTP companies for the period between 1972-
73 to 1991-92 was obtained from the lists provided in various issues of
the "Annual Report on the Working and Administration of the MRTP
Act, 1969". However, the number of take-overs involving non-MRTP
companies during this period could not be computed since the relevant
lists are not available. Further, separate lists of amalgamations and take-
overs for MRTP and Non-MRTP companies are not available for the
period after 1992-93, since sections 23 and 24 of Chapter III which dealt
with amalgamations and take-overs were removed through amendments
to the MRTP Act, 1969. The number of amalgamations for the period
1 The income tax Act, 1961 contains special provisions for some type of
amalgamation and provides for some tax reliefs subject to certain conditions. The
tax relief  relates to development rebate and development allowance. The finance
Act, 1967 extended the sphere of reliefs in tax matters in relation to an
amalgamation. Under the Act, as amended, the issue of shares by the transferee
company to the shareholders of the amalgamating companies will not by itself
give rise to a liability to capital gain tax. The shares in the transferee company
will be treated as the same as the shares in the amalgamating companies. It further
appears that no part of the value of the shares received by shareholders in exchange
under a scheme of amalgamation may be considered as dividend.
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between 1992-93 to 1994-95 was, however, computed from lists available
in the various issues of the publication "Registration and Liquidation of
Joint Stock Companies".
There are a number of aspects of the merger movement revealed
by these figures. First, from these lists it is clear that both MRTP and
non-MRTP companies have used mergers and take-overs as an important
means of growth since the 1970s. Second, there are signs of acceleration
in the merger movement in the liberalisation years of the 1990s. The
Table 1: Trends of Mergers and Acquisitions During 1972-73 to
1994-95
Mergers Takeovers
Year Non-Maf    Maf Total Non-Maf   Maf   Total
1974-79 48 108 156 0 11 11
Avg 10 22 31 0 2 2
1980-84 39 117 156 0 15 15
Avg 8 23 37 0 3 3
1985-89 33 79 113 6 85 91
Avg 10 23 35 2 17 18
1990-94 108 128 236 8 47 55#
Avg 22 25 47 Na Na Na
Source:- Registration and Liquidation of Joint Stock Companies in India,
Various Issues. Report on the working and Administration of the MRTP
Act, 1969, Department of Company Affairs, GOI, Various Issues.
Na = Not Available. #  represents only the number of takeovers for 1990-
91 and 1991-92 as the data for the rest of the years has not published.
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total number of amalgamations (computed from a listing of acquiring
firms alone) during the period 1975-76 to 1979-80 was 156 (See Table
1). That figure remained at 156 during the next quinquennium (1980-81
to 1984-85), and then fell to 113 during the period 1985-86 to 1989-90.
However, facilitated by changes in the policy environment, the number
of mergers rose sharply to 236 during the period 1990-91 to 1994-95.
Third, the evidence suggests that the number of amalgamations
among non-MRTP companies was always more than in the case of MRTP
companies during the period 1970-71 to 1990-91, although the
involvement of MRTP companies in the merger movement was relatively
higher in the eighties as compared with the seventies (see Table 2). For
instance, the total number of mergers among MRTP companies during
the periods 1980-81 to 1984-85 and 1985-86 to 1989-90 was 41 and 43
respectively whereas it was only 27 during the period of 1974-75 to
1979-80. This dominance of MRTP companies is of significance, given
the evidence discussed earlier, that the MRTP Act did not excessively
constrain mergers. Thus mergers may have been a means adopted by
non-MRTP firms to exploit the advantages of size in order to build their
competitive strengths, including those vis-à-vis the larger companies
belonging to the MRTP groups. Further, as reported in Table 2, it has
been found that more than 50 percent of mergers during the 1990s
involved acquiring firms in the manufacturing sector whose total assets
were below Rs. 100 crore. This numerical preponderance of 'non-MRTP'
firms is possible because size matters from the point of view of availing
the opportunities provided by the new economic policy. For instance,
the norm fixed for promoters' contribution for purposes of eligibility for
getting loans from financial institutions was hiked to 25 percent with
certain relaxation for large projects and projects promoted by first
generation entrepreneurs. Further, the debt equity norm for financial
institutions which was tightened to 1.5:1 as against 2:1 earlier could be
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relaxed to 2:1 only for large projects. The interest rates on financial
assistance provided by term lending institutions were made flexible with
a floor rate of 15 percent per annum, and FIs were also allowed to charge
higher interest rates on their loans taking in to account factors such as
credit worthiness of the borrowing unit (Company News & Notes, 1993).
Fourth, the figures also show that MRTP companies have been
increasingly resorting to takeovers since the 1970's, although the number
was insignificant. However there was a sharp increase (to 91) in the
number of takeovers among the MRTP companies during the period
between 1985-86 to 1989-90 whereas it was only 15 during the period
between 1980-81 to 1984-85. Once again, one of the reasons for this
sharp increase in the number of takeovers in the late eighties as compared
to the period before that could be the ethos of liberalisation and changes
in the law it generated.
Table 2: Composition of Amalgamated Companies during the
Period Between 1974-75 to 1994-95
MRTP Non-MRTP
Year Non-Maf    Maf  Total Non-Maf   Maf Total
1974-79 4 23 27 44 85 129
1980-84 5 36 41 34 81 115
1985-89 10 33 43 24 46 70
1990-94  Na Na 108 128 236
Source: Same as Table 1.
Na = Not Applicable since MRTP Act has been removed in 1991.
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Fifth, a categorisation of mergers in terms of manufacturing and
non-manufacturing firms showed that the participation of manufacturing
firms in the merger movement was always higher than that of the non-
manufacturing firms in the case of both MRTP and non-MRTP
companies throughout our study period. However, the participation of
non-manufacturing firms in the amalgamation trend increased sharply
in the 1990s. Thus, the annual average number of mergers among non-
manufacturing firms for the period of 1974-1979, 1980-1984 and 1985-
1989 stood at 10, 8 and 10 respectively whereas it was 22, 23 and 23 in
the case of manufacturing firms. However, the average number of non-
manufacturing firms resorting to mergers during the period 1990-94 had
touched 22, which was not far below the 25 recorded in the case of
manufacturing firms (see Table 1). One reason for this was the financial
liberalisation of the 1990s which not merely increased mergers among
financial firms for reasons of competitive capacity-building, but also
because of a tendency of firms to merge with dormant or "shell" finance
companies to facilitate early listing in the stock market. This possibility
of being quoted afforded by mergers with financial firms registered in
the market, allowed the private limited companies to exploit the capital
market boom through the private placement of shares. A merger with a
listed company allowed the firm concerned to provide a guarantee to the
external investor that the shares would be listed within a specified period
so as to offer the investor the possibility of exit. This is corroborated by
the evidence on the incidence of amalgamations involving private limited
as opposed to public limited companies during the period 1985-86 to
1994-95. That evidence shows that, while the overall involvement of
private limited firms in the amalgamation process was relatively lower
than that of public limited firms during this period, the share of cases
involving the former increased from 20 percent during 1985 to 1990 to
31 percent during 1990 to 1995. The evidence also shows, as expected,
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that the share of private limited firms involved in the merger process
was higher in the non-manufacturing than in the manufacturing sector.
Finally, the data shows that in mergers involving non-
manufacturing firms, while the participation of financial companies was
less than that of service companies during 1985-86 to 1994-95, the share
of financial companies increased from 26 percent during 1985-89 to 30
percent during 1990-91 to 1994-95 (Beena,1998).
Section III
The evidence presented in the previous section suggests that the
Indian private corporate sector have been considered mergers as a means
of growth since the seventies. The present section would focus more on
the significance of mergers during 1990s and its characteristics. Before
getting in to the discussion, we would like to brief the data, methodology
and the sample.
 Data, Methodology and the Sample
An attempt was made to construct a partial list of mergers which
had occurred in the manufacturing sector at the all-India level over the
period 1990-91 to 1994-95 by visiting the offices of the Regional
Directors of the Department of Company Affairs at  Kanpur, Madras
and Bombay. The office of the fourth Regional Director at Calcutta could
not be accessed for various reasons. Though the partial list compiled
from the office of the Regional Directors overlapped with the annual list
of mergers and amalgamations prepared by the R& D division of the
Department of Company Affairs (DCA), it included some firms that were
not listed by the DCA. The final list prepared for this analysis consisted
of the set of all mergers listed by the R&D division of the Department of
Company Affairs and those that were not included in the DCA list but
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whose records were available at the Regional Directors' Offices in three
regions. This list is, however, still partial, since it does not cover all
firms for which the records are available at the office of the Regional
Director of the Eastern region located at Calcutta. It is likely that while
a large number of such cases would be covered by the list used here,
there would be some mergers that may have been excluded, since they
may have been left out of the DCA list. That the likelihood that some of
the mergers relating to the Eastern region may have been left out of the
DCA list is high is suggested by the fact that a number of cases for
which records were available at the offices of the Regional Directors of
the DCA at Kanpur, Madras and Bombay were excluded from the All-
India DCA list. As a result even the partial list constructed for this study
is longer than the all-India list prepared by the  R&D division of the
Department of Company Affairs.
As per the partial list constructed for this study, there were at least
128 public limited firms involved, as acquiring firms, in the merger
process in the manufacturing sector during the period 1990-91 to 1994-
95, whereas the lists published by Department of Company Affairs
reported only 102 cases. Both these sets are constituted of cases which
are governed by sections 391-394 of the Companies Act, 1956. The reason
for the divergence between the two sets is not hard to find. There are two
reporting steps involved in the preparation of the list published by the
DCA. In the first step, as per the law, companies which are involved in a
merger are required to inform the Registrar of Companies (ROC) within
thirty days of the issue of an order by the High Court sanctioning a
merger. In the second step, based on the information received from the
companies, the ROC prepares a list of mergers for every month and
sends it to the R&D division of the DCA. The all-India list available
with the DCA might be incomplete if there is a delay in or a violation of
any one of these procedures.
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Significance of the Merger Process During the 1990s
A preliminary examination of the acquiring firms involved in the
merger process during the 1990s indicates that eventhough they account
for a marginal segment of the corporate sector as a whole, the size of
that segment has been increasing quite sharply through the 1990s. In
order to assess the relative size of the segment involved in the merger
process during the 1990s, we chose a sub-sample 109 mergers, in whose
case data on the paid-up capital of the acquiring firm was available in
the "Directory of Joint Stock Companies" (published in 1990). These
firms accounted for around 85 per cent of  total number of mergers (128)
included in the partial list for the manufacturing sector constructed from
the list of the DCA and the files in the various offices of the Department
of Company Affairs. A comparison of the total paid-up capital of the
acquiring firms involved in the mergers included in our sub-sample with
the paid-up capital of the corporate manufacturing sector as reported in
the "Annual Report on the Working and Administration of the Companies
Act 1956" of the Ministry of Law, Justice & Company Affairs provides
a reasonable estimation of the strength of the merger movement during
the 1990s. In case the paid-up capital for all the years could not be
obtained for any company the paid-up capital in the year 1990 was taken
as a proxy. As can be seen from Table 3, the share of  paid-up capital of
firms involved in the merger process in  paid up capital of  corporate
sector as a whole rose from 1.03 percentage in 1990-91 to 1.42% during
1991-92, 2.71% in 1993-94, and 3.54%  in 1994-95.
An interesting point that emerges from Table 3 is that the
strength of the major movement, as defined by us, has not depended on
the number of mergers in a particular year. Thus, the relative share of
total corporate paid-up capital of the acquiring firms was not high during
the year 1992-93 (1.15%) when compared with the  other years,  in spite
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of  it being a year characterised by the occurrence of a large number of
mergers. This divergence is because of the participation of a large number
of small sized firms in the merger movement in that particular year,
making mergers a less important influence on corporate structure as
compared with other years.
Table 3: Share of Acquiring Manufacturing Firms in the Public
Limited Private Corporate Manufacturing Sector During
1990-91 to 1994-95.
  Rs Lakhs
Private Corporate Total Acquiring Firms Share of Acquiring
Manufacturing Firms Firms to the Total (%)
Year       PUC   No PUC No PUC No
1990-91 1117920 12855 11468.10 12 1.03 0.09
1991-92 1349394 13717 19137.71 14 1.42 0.10
1992-93 1933997 15599 22166.75 39 1.15 0.25
1993-94 2403066 16862 65164.64 21 2.71 0.12
1994-95 2952634 19544 104455.30 23 3.54 0.12
Total 9757011 78577 222392.5 109 2.28 0.14
Source :-
(a) For  columns 1 and 2 "Annual Report on the Working and
Administration of the Companies Act 1956", Ministry of Law Justice
and Company Affairs, GOI, Various Years.
(b)  For columns 3 and 4  CIMM database,  Annual Reports of the various
firms, and the Directory of the Joint Stock Companies, 1990, Various
Volumes.
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In order to analyse the composition of acquiring firms in terms of
total assets, 94 out of 128 acquiring firms have been selected for which
the data on total assets could be obtained. Table 4 categorises the total
assets figure of all selected acquiring firms for each year during  period
1990-91 to 1994-95 into different size classes. While undertaking this
exercise we used total assets figure for the year 1990 as a proxy for
assets in all years in the case of those firms for which data for the later
period could not be obtained. Thus our figures underestimate the
significance of merger movement both because the sample is  partial
and  in some cases the data underestimates the actual size of assets.
Thus around 41 per cent (39 out of 94) of the acquiring firms
belong to the asset-size class of Rs 100 crore and above, which was the
cut-off asset figure in the now diluted MRTP Act. Looking at the official
categorisation of firms in the sample, it was found that 30 out of the 94
acquiring firms were listed as the MRTP companies as on 30/6/1989
(Company News & Notes,1989). Interestingly, as of 1990-91, only 13
out of these 30 held total assets which were in excess of Rs.100 cr, whereas
the rest of the firms belonged to size classes of below Rs.100 cr as on
that date. However, 27 out of these 30 MRTP firms were in  size class of
Rs.100 cr and above when they went in for the merger. Interestingly,
most of these firms which would have at an earlier date been classified
as MRTP firms had acquired another firm which both belonged to the
same management and produced a similar product. As per the law relating
to mergers, any merger involving these characteristics is exempt from
obtaining a special clearance from the government under the MRTP Act
and could opt for merger through High Court sanction alone. Thus, it
may not be true that MRTP regulations were responsible for these mergers
not having occurred prior to the 1990s. At the same time, it can further
be argued that most of these MRTP firm which have been involved in
the merger process could not have opted for this route  expansion if
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government had not diluted the MRTP Act. Thus the removal of
institutional entry barriers had encouraged a few Indian and foreign firms
to redefine their product portfolios and reformulate their corporate and
business strategies through the merger process.
Among the MRTP firms,  big firms dominated the merger process.
Thus, 16 out of 39 acquiring firms with assets more than Rs.100 crores
belonged to the asset-size class of Rs 500 crores. These 16 firms had
accounted for an overwhelming share of 86.52 per cent of the total assets
of the sample acquiring firms. Though 34 percent of the sampled mergers
involved small-sized firms belonging to the asset-size category of Rs 1
crore to Rs 25 crores, they accounted for a meagre 0.33 percent of the
total assets.
Table 4: Size-wise Distribution of 94 Acquiring Firms in Terms of
Total Assets and Number
                                                                    (Rs Lakhs)
Size 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95    Total   %Share
  to  total
Above 500 crores 118911 488021 427515 1288767 1599705 3922919 86.52
1 1 2 6 6 16 17.02
250-500 crores 46441 0 105725 34046 48874 235086 5.18
1 0 3 1 1 6 6.38
100-250 crores 68999 73228 57590 36623 60828 297268 6.56
4 4 3 2 4 17 18.09
25-100 crores 2545.00 0 42213 15843 2714 63315 1.40
1 0 7 2 1 11 11.70
10 to 25 crores 0.00 3254 2321 0 0 5575 0.12
0 2 2 0 0 4 4.26
5 to 10 crores 0.00 0 3179 0 0 3179 0.07
0 0 4 0 0 4 4.26
1 to 5 crores 815.61 633 2180 326 2283 6238 0.14
3 3 8 2 8 24 25.53
< 1 crore 92.52 58 20 242 0 413 0.01
2 2 4 4 0 12 12.77
Total 237804 565194 640743 1375847 1714404 4533992 100
12 12 33 17 20 94 100
Source: Same as Table 3
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Mergers, Concentration and Profitability
The fact that in terms of total assets mergers are concentrated in
MRTP firms, points to an increase in concentration as a result of the
merger movement. This tendency towards increased concentration was
however not too damaging  because the merger movement affected a
relatively small section of the private corporate sector. To illustrate this
we compare the size and performance of 68 out of 107 acquiring firms,
in whose case the required data on financial indicators could be obtained,
with the private corporate sector as a whole. The size and performance
of the latter is taken as being well represented by Reserve Bank of India's
surveys of  Finances of Public Limited Companies, 1991 to 1992, which
give the performance of non-financial public limited firms in the private
corporate sector in India.
Table 5 presents a comparison of the size of the sample of
acquiring firms considered for our purpose and the RBI's sample. The
former represents 3.7 percent of the latter in terms of number of
manufacturing firms, and accounts for 13.48 percent of the total paid-up
capital of the latter. Further, small firms with paid-up capital smaller
than 1 crore accounted for a much larger share of the RBI sample both in
terms of number and size of paid-up capital than was the case with the
sample of firms involved in mergers. While the latter sample likely to be
more biased in terms of inadequate coverage, this evidence of a
preponderance of larger firms in the merger movement does tally with
some of the results discussed earlier.
In terms of financial performance as well, the acquiring firms were
among the more successful during  1990-91 to 1994-95 (see Table 6).
We have measured profitability by using three different ratios and from
this it is observed that the acquiring firms performed relatively better as
compared to the overall-manufacturing sector. Firms relying on mergers
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Table 5: Size wise Distribution of Share of Sample Acquiring Firms
to the Total Manufacturing Sector(Rs.Lakhs)
Size RBI Sample   Acquiring Firms % Share
PUC No PUC No PUC   No
>25 crores 301,300 60 71,547.48 10 23.75 16.67
10 to 25 crores 154,100 112 12,571.38 9 8.16 8.04
5 to 10 crores 112,400 168 10,519.49 15 9.36 8.93
1 to 5 crores 156,100 724 6,879.64 25 4.41 3.45
25 Lakhs to 1 crore 30,400 518 662.12 9 2.18 1.74
5 Lakhs to 25 Lakhs 3,500 216 0 0 0 0
< 5 Lakhs 100 38 0 0 0 0
Total 757,900 1,836 102,180.11 68 13.48 3.7
Maf. = Manufacturing
Source:-
a) RBI Bulletin, October- November, 1995
b) The table titled "Selected Financial Parameters for the Year 1991-92
in respect of Large-Sized Non-Government Companies each having PUC
of Rs. 50 Lakhs or more" in Registration and Liquidation of Joint Stock
Companies in India, 1993-94
for growth require less of both their own reserves and debt to finance
their expansion.
Thus the contribution of reserves and surpluses for generating net
fixed assets in the case of the acquiring firms was relatively low when
compared with the private corporate manufacturing sector. Similarly,
acquiring firms were characterised by a relatively low ratio of debt to
equity as compared with the overall-manufacturing sector, suggesting
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that mergers helped them to maintain a more viable capital structure
when compared to the overall-manufacturing sector.
Section IV
The previous section argued that the new economic environment
in the 1990s had facilitated the merger process in the Indian corporate
sector. A few large corporations dominated the merger movement during
the 1990s. The financial performance of the acquiring firms was relatively
better than the performance of the overall private corporate manufacturing
sector. The present section seeks to extend that analysis, by looking
Table 6: Financial Performance of Acquiring Manufacturing Firms
and the Private Corporate Manufacturing Sector in India
Ratios 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95   Average
PBT/TA Acquiring 0.06 0.08 0.06 Na 0.09 0.07
Maf. 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.04
Sector
PBT/TI Acquiring 0.07 0.07 0.06 Na 0.09 0.07
Maf. 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.05
Sector
PBT/NW Acquiring 0.17 0.23 0.12 Na 0.2 0.18
Maf. 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.12
Sector
R&S/NFA Acquiring 0.72 0.63 0.87 Na 0.96 0.79
Maf. 1.94 1.89 1.75 1.55 1.35 1.69
Sector
Debt/Equity Acquiring 6.73 4.43 5.29 Na 4.39 5.21
Maf. 5.39 5.89 5.78 5.37 5.28 5.54
Sector
No of firms Acquiring 68 64 69 Na 61
Maf. 1,836 1,836 1,720 1,720 1,720
Sector
Note: Na: Not Available
Source: Same as Table 5
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closely at the nature of these mergers in terms of management and of
their economic rationale in a selected sample of 45 cases. This reduction
in sample size has the added advantage of restricting the analysis to
those cases wherein the papers submitted by the firm regarding the
scheme of amalgamation provided adequate details and could be
accessed. With this objective in mind we chose a sub-sample of 45
mergers out of 94. The choice was determined by the following
considerations: i) availability of the scheme of amalgamation;  ii)
availability of adequate information in the scheme relating to the period
of analysis; and iii) listing of the firm in the stock market, which made it
easier to obtain any supporting information that may be required. Though
the chosen sub-sample covered less than half (47.87 percent) of the
mergers, they accounted for almost 99% of the total assets of the acquiring
firms covered.
This was because special care was taken to cover the major and
important merger cases in each year during the period 1990-91 to 1994-
95. As a result, most firms have been drawn from the large sized class
since the evidence indicates that such mergers dominated during the
1990s.
Nature of Mergers
Besides the dominance of large sized firms in the merger movement
during the liberalisation years in the 1990s, the other remarkable
characteristic of the movement was the dominance of mergers between
firms under related management. By related management we mean here
firms which, either in terms of controlling block or in terms of other
indicators like company name, composition of the board of directors,
etc. are clearly identifiable as belonging to a particular business group
or house. Such information has been extracted from the scheme of
amalgamation and other documents related to the firms involved in the
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merger process. As Table 7 shows, more than 70 per cent of the 45 sample
cases relating to the period 1990-91 to 1994-95  involved mergers between
companies under the same management. In terms of total assets these
firms accounted for a comparable 77.57 percent of the total assets of all
the sample firms.
The dominance of mergers between related firms is overwhelming
even though there are signs of an increase in the role of mergers between
unrelated companies or those under different management. In terms of
number of firms, the share of 'unrelated mergers' rose almost continuously
from around 17 per cent in 1990/91 to 40 per cent in 1994/95. However,
in terms of total assets only 6.87 per cent of the total assets of the selected
acquiring firms involved in mergers in 1990-91 were of those
participating in unrelated mergers. Though this share increased over the
1990s, it remained as low as 13.99 per cent even in 1994-95. In fact,
there was one year (1993-94) in which the share in total sample assets of
acquiring firms involved in unrelated mergers was relatively high (48.4
per cent). However, when looked at in terms of the number of firms
involved in unrelated mergers, the figure remained small (3 firms
accounting for 27 per cent of the sample firms).
The Role of Foreign Firms
A second issue of importance in the analysis of merger trends
during the liberalisation years is the role of foreign firms in the process.
There are a number of reasons why this issue is of importance. To start
with, the 1990s were a period in which controls on the operation of
foreign firms in India were considerably diluted, encouraging them to
set up and build their operations in India. In fact, it has been argued that
one of the reasons for the increase in mergers during the 1990s was the
keenness of international firms to exploit this opportunity, (Khanna, 1993)
which in some instances is furthered through mergers with existing
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Table 7:  Pattern of Mergers in India During the Period 1990-1 to
1994-95
Year Unrelated   Related                Total
T Assets % share to T Assets  % share to   T Assets % share  to
Total   Total Total
1990-91 16115 6.87 218236 93.12 234351 100
1 16.66 5 83.33 6 100
1991-92 11885 2.11 551195 97.88 563080 100
1 16.66 5 83.33 6 100
1992-93 75389 12.18 543514 87.81 618903 100
4 33.33 8 66.66 12 100
1993-94 665751 48.4 709528 51.59 1375279 100
3 27.27 8 72.72 11 100
1994-95 237245 13.98 1458835 86.01 1696080 100
4 40 6 60 10 100
Total 1,006,385 22.42 3,481,308 77.57 4487693 100
13 28.88 32 71.11 45 100
Source: Same as Table 4 and the Schemes of Amalgamation.
Table 8: Pattern of Total Mergers in Terms of Ownership  (Rs Lakhs)
Indian Owned Foreign Owned             Total
   Year T.Assets % share T.Assets % share to T.Assets    %  share to
to the total  the Total the  Total
1990-91 234351 100 0 0.00 234351 100
6 100 0 0.00 6 100
1991-92 563080 100 0 0.00 563080 100
6 100 0 0.00 6 100
1992-93 317591 51.32 301312 48.68 618903 100
8 66.67 4 33.33 12 100
1993-94 1157661 84.18 217618 15.82 1375279 100
8 72.73 3 27.27 11 100
1994-95 1546393 91.17 149687 8.83 1696080 100
7 70.00 3 30.00 10 100
Total 3819076 85.10 668617 14.90 4487693 100
35 77.78 10 22.22 45 100
Source: Same as Table 4.
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operators rather than through the establishment of greenfield projects.
Secondly, the 1990s have been years in which foreign direct investment
flows into India have risen from less than half a billion dollars to more
than 3 billion dollars a year. This makes India's experience a part of the
international experience with regard to rising FDI flows during the 1990s.
Interestingly, one aspect of the latter has been the role of rising cross-
border mergers and acquisitions in explaining the cross-border flows of
capital. It would therefore be useful to examine whether foreign firms in
part due to an increase in cross-border mergers resort to the rise in FDI
flows into India. Finally, the liberalisation years have seen some striking
instances of acquisitions and mergers involving foreign firms.
However, the evidence yielded by our sample  partially confirms
these expectations. Foreign firms have  a significant presence among
acquiring firms involved in the merger process, but not a dominant
presence. In the 45 sample cases studied, foreign owned business firms
controlled 22.22 percent of the acquiring companies. In terms of total
assets of the sample-acquiring firms, their share was even lower at 14.90
percent. The rest of the mergers were between the companies under Indian
ownership. But it needs to be noted that the presence of foreign firms
among merging entities is visible only after 1992-93 (See Table 8). This
could be because the relaxation of FERA regulations occurred in January
1992, when foreign companies were allowed to open branches, permitted
to use their trademarks, carry out any activity of a trading, commercial
or industrial nature, borrow money and accept fixed deposits like any
other Indian company. It is noteworthy that in 1992/93, foreign firms,
which were not involved in mergers till that year, accounted for one-
third of the acquiring firms in the sample, and for almost half the total
assets of the sample acquiring firms. Though these shares fell in the
subsequent two years, they did remain significant.
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What is interesting is the nature of mergers analysed in terms of
relationship between the management of  merging firms. As is to be
expected from our analysis earlier, out of the mergers involving Indian
owned acquiring firm, around 71 per cent was between companies under
related management. However, looked at as a trend, there appears to be
a marginal shift towards the participation of unrelated entities in mergers
involving Indian owned firms, with a sharp swing in favour of unrelated
mergers in 1994/95. While these aspects of mergers between Indian
owned firms is as expected, the structure of mergers involving foreign
firms is surprising. Here also we find that mergers between firms under
the same management play an important role, accounting for 70 per cent
of the mergers and almost 80 per cent of total assets of acquiring firms
involved in 'foreign-owned mergers' during the 1990s. Thus, the factors
that encouraged  splitting of operations in India in the years prior to
liberalisation obviously influenced foreign players as well, and the need
to retreat from that strategy in the liberalisation years seems to also apply
in their case.
Finally, if we compare the relative roles of Indian- and foreign-
owned firms in mergers involving the same and those involving different
managements. We further observed that while the dominance of Indian
owned firms in the arena of related mergers was complete, their
dominance over the arena of unrelated mergers was also overwhelming.
The similarity in distribution across related and unrelated mergers implied
by these figures suggests that the pattern and therefore the objectives of
foreign firms involved in mergers were more or less the same as those of
Indian firms.
Structure of Mergers
Some idea of the nature of such internal restructuring can be
gleaned from an analysis of the structure of mergers during the 1990s.
Based on the product profile of the acquiring and acquired firms, the
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selected mergers have been categorised into horizontal, vertical and
conglomerate mergers. This exercise has been carried out based on the
data available in the Directory of the Bombay Stock Exchange.  Out of
the 45 sample cases chosen for this study, around 69 per cent (31 cases)
were horizontal mergers (i.e. between the firms under the same industry).
The remaining cases were divided equally between vertical mergers
(between the firms which are complementary to each other) and
conglomerate mergers (between firms producing unrelated products).
In terms of total assets, however, only 50.57 per cent of the total assets
were with acquiring firms involved in horizontal mergers, whereas a
disproportionately large 44.32 per cent were with firms involved in
vertical mergers (See Table 9). Conglomerate mergers accounted for a
relatively small 5.11 percent of the total assets of the acquiring firms.
These figures suggest that while horizontal mergers dominate, some of
the larger firms were opting for vertical mergers, leading to a higher
share of assets involved in such mergers as compared with their share in
the number of mergers. Conglomerate mergers between firms in different
industries were both asset-wise and numerically not a significant option.
Further, the evidence points to an increasing trend in the share of
horizontal mergers both in terms of number and total assets during the
period of analysis, whereas conglomerate mergers registered a declining
trend over time. Thus the internal restructuring that resulted in the spate
of mergers during the 1990s appears to be of two kinds. Firstly, there are
signs of consolidation aimed possibly at increasing size, deriving
marketing advantages, deriving financial benefits for specific or all
shareholders and exploiting scale economies outside that of production
(since the units already exist as separate entities). Secondly, there are
signs of mergers aimed at   the synergies associated with vertical mergers;
at linking more closely the production plans of related firms; at reducing
costs through transferring margins to the final stage; at increasing size;
and at deriving financial benefits for specific or all shareholders.
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The dominance of horizontal merger has, as expected, affected
the product market share of  individual acquiring firms  before and after
merger. We estimated the share of value of sales by product lines of a
sample of 43 acquiring firms in their corresponding 'industry totals' for
the period 1990-91 and 1994-95. The market share of the major product
lines of these acquiring firms and the total sales of the corresponding
industries are collected from the India's industrial sector, 1996 published
by Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy Pvt.Ltd. It needs to be noted
that the "industry total" provided there, in some cases, included the sales
of only a selected set of major firms within that industry. However, from
this exercise, it is observed that the ratio of the total sales of the sample
of acquiring firms to the total sales of the respective industries has
increased from 0.24 to 0.58 during the period 1990-91 to 1994-95. The
ratio of the total sales of those acquiring firms which have merged with
the related product lines to the total sales of the respective industries has
increased from 0.193 to 0.244. Thus, even if not substantially due to
related mergers, the process of amalgamation does seem to have
contributed to some increase in product-wise concentration. However,
as mentioned earlier since related mergers dominated the merger
movement, these changes would not have amounted to much when we
take account of the fact that the representative unit of capital2  in the
India's  corporate  sector  is the  business  group  and not the  individual
firm.
2 The defining feature of this unit was that unlike the diversified, single conglomerate
firm which was the industrial, decision making unit in the West, the business
group consisted of a large number of  legally independent  firms which functioned
as a single entity according to the dictates of a single decision-making authority
(see Dutt, 1969; Ghose, 1972; Hazari, 1986).
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An interesting feature is the distribution of horizontal and vertical
mergers between firms under the same and under separate managements.
Horizontal mergers overwhelmingly dominated 'unrelated mergers' and
accounted for 88.34 percent of the total assets of acquiring firms involved
in mergers between firms under unrelated management. On the other
hand, vertical mergers, though small in number in mergers among firms
under the same management, accounted for a disproportionately large
share of the assets of acquiring firms involved in such mergers (Table
9). Interestingly, conglomerate mergers though equal in number to vertical
mergers in the case of both 'related' and 'unrelated' mergers, accounted
for a small share of total assets of the acquiring firms involved,
independent of whether the mergers were between firms under the same
or different management. Thus consolidation  of  unrelated firms in a
particular industry was an important part of the restructuring process as
was the consolidation of firms under the same management in the same
industry. On the other hand, consolidation of related firms aimed at linking
different stages of production under a single legal unit seems to be the
dominant objective behind vertical mergers.
Interestingly, while there are no differences between Indian and
foreign-owned acquiring firms in terms of mergers between related and
unrelated companies, there are differences with regard to the relative
roles of horizontal and vertical mergers. Among Indian-owned, unrelated
mergers included in the sample, horizontal mergers account for 85.27
percent of the total assets of the acquiring firms. The rest of the assets
were distributed among conglomerate and vertical mergers, with the latter
dominating the remaining assets share (Table 10). Among Indian owned
related mergers on the other hand, horizontal mergers that constituted
60 per cent of the number of mergers, accounted for only 29.14 percent
of the total assets. 20 per cent of firms involved in vertical mergers
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accounted for 64.32 per cent of assets of acquiring firms (Table 11).
This is obviously due to the participation of large sized firms in the
vertical merger process, resulting in the domination of vertical mergers
in assets of acquiring firms involved in related mergers.
As compared with the experience of Indian firms, mergers
involving foreign owned firms were all in the nature of horizontal
mergers. Thus, it can be concluded that: (i) mergers involving foreign
firms, which accounted for one-fifth of the total acquiring firms during
the 1990s, were similar to mergers involving Indian firms inasmuch as
most of these firms acquired another firm belonging to the same
management; and (ii) these mergers were different from Indian mergers
inasmuch as they were all horizontal mergers between companies which
were engaged in the same product lines.
Section V
Mergers and the Growth of Firms
Since consolidation of related firms seems to be a factor explaining
mergers during the 1990s, one question that arises is whether the
attainment of larger size was an important objective driving the merger
movement. To answer that question, this section analyses the growth of
acquiring firms, the role of acquisition in the growth of these firms and
the other means through which the growth of acquiring firm has been
financed during these years. This exercise is restricted to 34 firms, since
adequate information for the rest of the firms could not be obtained.
However in terms of number, it covers 76 percent of the total sample. In
terms of total assets, it covers 83.14 percent of the total assets of  total
sample- acquiring firms.
In terms of absolute size, the total assets of the selected 34 firms
increased by Rs.265.67 billion over the period 1989-90 to 1994-95. The
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gross fixed assets of the acquiring companies for the corresponding period
increased by Rs.151.41 billion. The annual average growth rate during
the period 1989-90 to 1994-95 stood at 25.73 percent in the case of total
assets and 24.86 percent in the case of gross fixed capital. When the
figures are deflated by the CSO's  gross fixed capital formation deflator
(base 1980-81=100) obtained from National Accounts Statistics these
rates of growth amounted to 16.78 and 15.93 percent respectively.
Whereas at the all India level, the annual average growth of capital
formation of private corporate sector was 16.96 per cent during the
corresponding period. Around 26 percent of the total acquiring firms
recorded a growth rate of total assets of 20 per cent and above. Another
50 per cent of the total acquiring firms recorded  a growth rate of between
10 and 19.9 per cent. The growth of gross fixed capital amounted to 20
percent and above in the case of 35 per cent of the selected acquiring
firms, and around an equal number recorded growth rates between 0 and
9.9 per cent. The data reveals that a larger number of acquiring firms
which merged with an unrelated firm registered growth rates of 20 %
and above in their gross fixed capital inspite of the lower growth in total
assets.
Role of Acquisition in the Growth of Acquiring Firms
From Table 13 and Table 14, it is also evident that assets acquired
through mergers accounted for a significant but by no means
overwhelming share of the growth in total assets and fixed assets. The
ratio of total assets (or the total gross fixed capital) of the acquired firms
before the year of merger to the increase in the size of the total assets( or
gross fixed capital) of the acquiring companies over the period 1989-90
to 1994-95 is used to measure the role of acquisition in explaining asset
expansion. Only 17.87 percent of the increase in total assets and 20.09
39
percent of the increase in the gross fixed capital of the sample-acquiring
firms were due to acquisition through merger.
In the case of about one-fourth of the sample acquiring firms,
acquisition accounted for 20% or more of the growth in total assets during
the period 1989-90 to 1994-95. In the case of increases in gross fixed
capital, acquisition amounted for 20 percent or more of the growth during
Table 13: Distribution of Firms According to the Role of Acquisition
in the Growth of Total Assets
Gr of T Assets Nature of Firms % Share
   Related Unrelated Total
0-9.9 13 4 17 50
10-19.9 5 3 8 23.53
20-29.9 2 0 2 5.88
>30 5 2 7 20.59
Total 25 9 34 100.00
Source: CIMM Data Base and the Annual report of the acquired firms
for the previous  period of Merger
Table 14: Distribution of Firms According to the Role of Acquisition
in the Growth of GFA
Gr of GFA Nature of Firms % share to total
Related Unrelated Total
0-9.9 12 4 16 47.06
10-19.9 5 3 8 23.53
20-29.9 3 0 3 8.82
>30 5 2 7 20.59
Total 25 9 34 100.00
Source: CIMM Data Base and the Annual report of the acquired firms
for the period prior to the merger
40
this period in the case of around 29 percent of the sample acquiring
firms. However, in the case of half of   total acquiring firms, acquisition
explained  only 0-9.9 percent of the growth in their assets during this
period.
While most of the firms which registered a relatively smaller
expansion in GFA had a smaller share explained by acquisition, those
which registered large increases in gross fixed assets of 20 percent and
above did not have a large share of their asset expansion explained by
acquisition. Thus there appears to be no asset growth group in which
acquisition played a dominant role, suggesting that there is little relation
between asset expansion and acquisition.
The relatively insignificant role of expansion as an explanation
for merger ties in with our earlier understanding that mergers were more
a means of internal restructuring than an instrument of further product
market or asset share. It also suggests that the pursuit of size alone, with
the aim of having a larger equity base on which to undertake borrowing,
could not have been the determining stimulus for the merger wave of the
1990s.
Financing Growth in Total Asset of Acquiring Firms
One of the reasons why mergers were not a major means of asset
expansion during the 1990s was the fact that such expansion could be
easily financed through funds acquired from a capital market rendered
buoyant by the initial effects of liberalisation and the stock market scam.
An analysis of the major source of funds of the sample of 34 firms
involved in mergers, shows that 71 percent of the total assets of the
acquiring firms during the period 1989-90 to 1994-95 was mobilised
from external sources. Among these, the capital market accounted for
33 per cent of the total funds acquired and current liabilities for another
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21.8 percent. Only about 16 percent of the total funds were mobilised
through borrowing. The major share of the funds mobilised from the
capital market was obtained in the form of a premium on shares sold.
An analysis of the shares of different sources of funds in firms
classified by the rate of growth of their total assets (Table 15) indicates
that firms which recorded high rates ( 20 percent and above) mobilised a
large share of their resources from the capital market, i.e., 46.84 percent.
On the other hand, the firms which showed an annual average growth
rate of  10-19.9 percent in its total assets mobilised a relatively lower
share of resources from the capital market, i.e., 17.52 percent. These
firms mobilised a larger share of resources through borrowing. Firms
which recorded a rate of growth of assets of less than 10 percent mobilised
26.81 percent of their resources from the capital market and another
32.98 percent of the total funds through internal financing. In sum, it
appears that during the 1990s firms targeting a high rate of growth of
assets exploited other sources of finance, particularly the buoyant capital
market, and were not dependent on "external" means to growth like
mergers and acquisitions.
From Table 15, it appears that firms which had a higher growth in
their total assets mobilised a relatively large share of resources from the
capital market through share premium, although they  paid a lower rate
of dividend (i.e., 23%) relative to their total earnings. It can also be
observed that the firms, which had an annual growth rate of 10-19.9
percent in their total assets, could mobilise only 17.52 percent of their
total resources through the capital market inspite of paying out large
dividends relative to their total earnings i.e. 42.55 percent. This may be
because low-growth are also the less successful firms which attracted
investors by providing greater incentives in the form of higher dividends
paid out as compared with the more successful firms.
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Conclusion
To conclude, acquisitions and mergers, although always an
important means of corporate growth since the seventies, it became much
more prominent during the early 1990s in the Indian corporate sector.
While liberalisation has spawned a merger wave among large firms, the
removal of barriers such as those created by the MRTP Act do not appear
to be the proximate cause for mergers. However the policies of economic
liberalisation adopted during those years triggered a sharp increase in
mergers between domestically owned companies and between
domestically owned companies and companies under foreign ownership.
The acceleration of the merger movement in the 1990s was accompanied
Table 15: Distribution of Source of Finance of Total Sample
Acquiring Firms According to the Growth in T Assets
During the Period of 1989-90 to 1994-95
Sources of Finance 0-9.9 10-19.9 >20 Total
Retained Profits 17.11 16 17.54 16.88
Depreciation 15.87 9.52 14.28 12.37
Internal Finance 32.98 25.53 31.82 29.24
Capital Market 26.21 17.52 46.84 33.02
Fresh Capital 3.9 4.43 2.91 3.63
Share Premium 18.19 13.93 35.08 24.98
Debentures 4.2 -1.62 9.78 4.56
T.Borrowing 14.74 21.15 11.61 15.9
Current Liabilities 26.06 35.55 9.73 21.84
External Financing 67.02 74.47 68.18 70.76
Total 100 100 100 100
No of Firms 8 17 9 34
% Share of Div.paid
to Profit After Tax  28.68 42.55 23 32.93
Source: CIMM Data Base
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by the dominance of mergers between firms belonging to the same
business group or house. This has two implications. First, it could be
argued that while the merger movement may have contributed to an
increase in product or asset concentration measured on a firm-wise basis,
it could not have contributed to an increase in concentration as measured
by the relative shares of business groups. Thus the liberalisation-induced
merger wave of the 1990s did not have as its principal locomotive, the
drive to reproduce and extend the bases of monopoly power of big capital
in India.
The second, related implication of the evidence cited above is that
the objective underlying the acceleration in mergers in the 1990s was
the need for business groups to restructure themselves. If hitherto the
business groups preferred to carry out similar or unrelated activities
through the creation of a number of legally independent firms, there
appears to be a change that occurred in the 1990s, with firms obviously
preferring to integrate hitherto separate operations under a single legal
entity. The factors that explain this drive to integrate also therefore are
the factors that explain the increase in the number and significance of
mergers during the 1990s. Acquisitions contributed significantly to asset-
growth in only one fifth of the sample firms studied. Further the study
suggests that  merger was not a route to growth which was dominantly
financed through resources acquired from a buoyant share market.
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 Appendix
Legal Procedures for Merger, Amalgamations and Take-overs
The control exercised by the government over mergers is articulated
in an elaborate legal framework embodied in the Companies Act and the
MRTP Act. The general law relating to mergers, amalgamations and
reconstruction is embodied in sections 391 to 396 of the Companies
Act, 1956 which jointly deal with the compromise and arrangement with
creditors and members of a company needed for a merger. Section 391
gives the High Court the power to sanction a compromise or arrangement
with creditors and members, subject to certain conditions. Section 392
gives the power to the High Court to enforce and supervise the carrying
out of such compromises or arrangements with creditors and members.
Section 393 provides for the availability of the information required by
the creditors and members of the concerned company when acceding to
such an arrangement. Section 394 makes provisions for facilitating
reconstruction and amalgamation of companies. Section 395  gives power
and duty to acquire the shares of shareholders dissenting from the scheme
or contract approved by the majority. And Section 396 deals with the
power of the central government to provide for an amalgamation of
companies in the national interest.
In any scheme of amalgamation, both the amalgamating company
or companies and the amalgamated company should comply with the
requirements specified in sections 391 to 394 and submit details of all
the formalities for consideration of the High Court. It is not enough if
one of the companies alone fulfils the necessary formalities. Sections
394, 394A of the Companies Act deal with the procedures and the
requirements to be followed in order to effect amalgamations of
companies coupled with the provisions relating to the powers of the
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court and the central government in the matter of bringing about
amalgamations of companies.
After the application is filed, the High Court would pass orders
with regard to the fixation of the dates of the hearing, and the provision
of a copy of the application to the Registrar of Companies and the
Regional Director of the Company Law Board in accordance with section
394A and to the Official Liquidator for the report confirming that the
affairs of the company have not been conducted in a manner prejudicial
to the interest of the shareholders or the public. Before sanctioning the
scheme of amalgamation, the court has also to give notice of  every
application made  to it under section 391 to 394 to the central government
and the court should take into consideration the representations, if any,
made to it by the government before passing any order granting or
rejecting the scheme of amalgamation. Thus the central government is
provided with an opportunity to have a say in the matter of amalgamations
of companies before the scheme of amalgamation is approved or rejected
by the court. The powers and functions of the central government in this
regard are exercised by the Company Law Board through its Regional
Directors. While hearing the petitions of the companies in connection
with the scheme of amalgamation, the court would give the petitioner-
company an opportunity to meet all the objections which may be raised
by shareholders, creditors, the government and others. It is, therefore,
necessary for the company to keep itself ready to face the various
arguments and challenges. Thus by the order of the Court, the properties
or liabilities of the amalgamating company get transferred to the
amalgamated company. Under section 394, the court has been specifically
empowered to make specific provisions in its order sanctioning an
amalgamation for the transfer to the amalgamated company of the whole
or any parts of the properties, liabilities, etc. of the amalgamated company.
The rights and liabilities of the employees of the amalgamating company
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would stand transferred to the amalgamated company only in those cases
where the court specifically directs so in its order. The assets and liabilities
of the amalgamating company automatically gets vested in the
amalgamated company by virtue of the order of the court granting a
scheme of amalgamation. The court also make provisions for the means
of payment to the shareholders of the transferor companies, continuation
by or against the transferee company of any legal proceedings pending
by or against any transferor company, the dissolution (without winding
up) of any transferor company, the provision to be made for any person
who dissents from the compromise or arrangement, and any other
incidental consequential and supplementary matters to secure the
amalgamation process if it is necessary. The order of the court granting
sanction to the scheme of amalgamation must be submitted by every
company to which the order applies (i.e., the amalgamating company
and the amalgamated company) to the Registrar of Companies for
registration within thirty days.
Provisions in the MRTP Act
The law relating to mergers also explicitly prescribed that any
merger or amalgamation, which increased concentration of asset
ownership, should not be approved by the High Court. Thus wherever
such a possibility existed the role of the High Court as the agency which
ensured that a merger was not prejudicial to the interests of its members
or the public was superseded by the role of the central government as an
agency that safeguards the national interest. This was done under Section
23 of the MRTP Act. According to sub-section (2) of this section,
Government approval for amalgamations was necessary in the following
circumstances: (i) if one MRTP undertaking amalgamated with another
undertaking; and (ii) if, on amalgamation of two or more undertakings,
an undertaking came into existence which became registrable under the
MRTP Act.
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As per the law, the power of the central government under section
23 of the MRTP Act overrode the power of the Court to sanction a scheme
of merger or amalgamation under sections 391 to 396  of  the Companies
Act. According to this section, no scheme for the merger or amalgamation
of an undertaking could be sanctioned by any Court or would be
recognised for any purpose or would be given effect to unless the scheme
for such merger or amalgamation had been approved by the central
government under the specific provisions of  this section. The owner of
the undertaking had to make an application to the central government
for the approval. The scheme of approval could not be modified without
the previous approval of the central government. The approval of the
central government was not necessary for the merger or amalgamation
of interconnected undertakings (which were not dominant undertakings)
if they produced the same goods or provided the same services. If  one
of the transacting parties is a non-resident Indian, then transfer of shares
could be made only with the permission of the RBI.
Finally, the provisions under the sections 23 and 24 of chapter 3 of
MRTP Act were abolished in 1991. As a result, the MRTP commission
does not play a role in mergers and acquisitions in the same manner in
which it used to. But, it does play a role in cases where it believes that a
merger or a take-over would lead to restrictive trade practices  Regarding
take-overs there were no comprehensive regulations to govern these
activities until  the new clauses 40A and 40B were incorporated in May
1990 although both the companies Act (section 395) and the MRTP Act
(section 24) had provisions for corporate take-overs. According to this
clause, any person who acquires 5% or more of the shares in a company
must notify the stock exchange and when the holdings cross 10%, a
public offer to purchase shares must be made. However, this agreement
was restricted to only listed companies and was effective only when
either of the parties in an acquisition was a listed company.  In November
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1994, the Securities and Exchange Board of India came out with SEBI
(Substantial acquisition of shares and take-overs) Regulation, 1994 to
regulate the take-over of the companies. But this code was inadequate to
address all the complexities and therefore a new committee was set up
to review the present code. The committee under the chairmanship of
P.N.Bhagwati suggested substantial modifications in the existing code.
The important changes are:
- consolidation of holdings by an existing shareholder holding not
less than 10 percent of voting rights will be allowed;
- Conditional bid will be allowed;
- Acquirer will be required to deposit upfront 10 percent of the
total consideration in an Escrow account;
- Time limit for competitive bidding has been extended to 21 days;
- The consideration shall be payable even by exchange and/ or
transfer of secured instruments with a minimum of 'A' grade rating from
a credit rating agency. The valuation of the instrument will be duly
certified by an Independent category 1 merchant banker or a chartered
accountant of 10 years standing;
- Acquisition of shares by the acquirer during offer period is
permitted, except in case of conditional offer;
- Time schedule for each event in the take-over process has been
specified;
- Waiting for offer letter by SEBI has been dispensed with.
Thus the revised code is applicable to the take-overs through
acquisition of control over a company irrespective of whether or not
there has been any acquisition of shares or voting rights in the company
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whereas, the present code restricts its applicability to take- overs through
acquisition of shares or voting rights. However mergers and
amalgamations constitute a subject matter of companies Act, 1956 and
is outside the perview of SEBI.
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